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Huatulco

Huatulco after FONATUR

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By Randy Jackson

In 2023, a milestone agreement was reached that would alter the development path of the federally planned tourism resort of Huatulco. This agreement transfers the assets, responsibilities, and obligations of the developer, FONATUR (Fondo Nacional de Fomento a Turismo), to the State of Oaxaca and the municipality of Santa María Huatulco.

Huatulco was conceived, built, and financed by the federally run tourism development organization known as FONATUR, responsible for Mexico’s nationally developed resorts known as CIPs – Centros Integralmente Planeado, or fully-planned [tourism] centers, the first of which was Cancún in 1974. Prior to development, the Huatulco area was a pristine collection of bays and isolated fishing villages without road connections. Since 1984, FONATUR has developed, maintained, and operated Huatulco through the administrations of several different presidents. Under the recent presidency of Andrés Manuel López Obrador (AMLO), in a bid to decentralize tourism management in Mexico, the entire resort of Huatulco, along with the Mazatlán Marina, Los Cabos, Ixtapa, and parts of Cancún and Cozumel, were all slated to be transferred from FONATUR to state and local authorities. For Huatulco, this transition has begun.

In this article, I outline what we know about Huatulco’s FONATUR transition, its implications, and some of its current challenges.

The Transfer Agreements

1) Convenio General de Colaboración (General Collaboration Agreement), dated May 30, 2023. The agreement states that FONATUR transfers public services and infrastructure management in Huatulco’s CIP to the state government, including roads, water systems, lighting, and waste management. FONATUR will donate related assets and collaborate with the state of Oaxaca during the transition.

2) An agreement dated December 29, 2023, effective January 1, 2024. This agreement formalizes the transfer of infrastructure and public service management in the Huatulco CIP from FONATUR to the state of Oaxaca and the municipality of Santa María Huatulco. It includes transferring assets like water systems, waste management facilities, roads, green spaces, and financial support of $143.8 million MXN ($7.2 million USD) in 2024 to ensure seamless operations.

3) A modification agreement, dated January 4, 2024, amends the above agreement to designate FIDELO (Fideicomiso para el Desarrollo Logístico del Estado de Oaxaca, or the Trust for the Logistical Development of the State of Oaxaca), a state-run entity, as the primary entity to manage the transferred assets and oversee services like water supply, sanitation, and waste management.

The transfer agreements also state that FONATUR remains the legal title holder of the properties until all legal and administrative approvals are secured. It also states that FIDELO is to provide quarterly and annual reports to FONATUR detailing the operation and maintenance of the transferred infrastructure and services. These reports are to include financial statements, operational metrics, and compliance with established service standards. These reports have not been made public.

Enter FIDELO

FIDELO is a parastatal entity (a public corporation) created by the state of Oaxaca on February 15, 1997. Its main objective is to position the state as a competitive region for developing various productive sectors through the promotion and execution of logistics, social, commercial, and tourism projects. Among the functions of FIDELO are to:

· carry out infrastructure and urbanization works
· obtain credits and grant guarantees for financing
· enter into agreements with public and private entities to promote the state’s economic development

FIDELO has been involved in various projects in Oaxaca, notably revitalizing the Parque Industrial y Maquilador (Industrial and Manufacturing Park) in Magdalena Apasco, Etla (outside Oaxaca City). However, public information on FIDELO’s other projects is limited.

FIDELO has now assumed the public services and infrastructure management previously performed by FONATUR in Huatulco. This includes the water and wastewater systems, parks and boulevard maintenance, solid waste collection, landfill operations, infrastructure maintenance, and all areas of administration required for such services. FIDELO has appointed Lorenzo Lavariega Arista, a former president of the municipio of Santa María Huatulco, as Director of Tourism Center Development. He has an office in Huatulco.

When FIDELO assumed its current Huatulco obligations from FONATUR, it incorporated all the FONATUR staff who provided the transferred services. There followed a staff reduction of about 25%. Lavariega has said he expects the staffing level to increase as the budget allows. Both state and federal 2025 budgets are expected to be approved before the end of December 2024.

Transfer Implications for Huatulco

Transferring the Huatulco CIP from federal to local management has sparked significant concerns for residents and visitors. Oaxaca, the second poorest state in Mexico, may struggle to manage the project’s financial and operational demands. This is particularly alarming given the current inadequacies in critical infrastructure, such as potable water and sewage treatment, which are insufficient to meet existing needs. Urgent upgrades and maintenance are required to ensure sustainability and support future growth.

Additionally, FONATUR had outlined a vision for Huatulco’s future development. However, with its departure, the long-term strategy and prospects for Huatulco’s growth under state and local administration remain unclear beyond the immediate transition of services. While FONATUR has relinquished operational responsibilities, it retains a significant presence as the owner and marketer of undeveloped properties in Huatulco.

FONATUR’s underfunding of Huatulco in recent years has significantly contributed to the current challenges in critical infrastructure, leaving the state of Oaxaca, with at least some federal funding, to prioritize much-needed upgrades. Despite these pressing issues, the transition of operational control from FONATUR to the state of Oaxaca began over a year ago, but the state has not announced a comprehensive plan or future vision for Huatulco.

According to Director Lavariega, Huatulco is of great importance to the state of Oaxaca as a key driver of tourism and economic development. There are no plans for the municipio of Santa María Huatulco to assume the obligations currently held by FIDELO following the transition. Looking ahead, Lavariega anticipates that CIP Huatulco’s needs will be prioritized and addressed depending on the allocation of federal and state resources.

The transition from FONATUR to state and local control marks a pivotal moment in Huatulco’s development, and its future remains uncertain. While FIDELO has taken over essential services and infrastructure management, significant challenges persist, particularly regarding the adequacy of funding for infrastructure to support the area’s growing needs.

With Huatulco positioned as an important driver of tourism and economic growth in Oaxaca, the coming months and years will reveal whether the state can rise to the occasion and deliver a sustainable vision for Huatulco’s future. As residents, businesses, and visitors await some news of the path forward, the story of Huatulco after FONATUR is far from finished—its next chapter has yet to be written.

For comments or contact, email: box95jackson@gmail.com.

Huatulco

You – Yes, You! The Impact of Tourism on Mexico’s Water Shortage

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By Deborah Van Hoewyk

We’ve probably all heard about the water crisis in Mexico City (see Julie Etra’s article elsewhere in this issue), but Mexico City’s problems are just the worst example of a country-wide shortage of water.

· Historically, 30 of Mexico’s 32 states have suffered from water scarcity; currently, drought conditions affect all of Mexico except Oaxaca and parts of Veracruz and Puebla. January to May of this year was the driest spring ever recorded.
· Having water is not the same as getting water – in places with plumbing, up to 40% of the water is lost through leaks in poorly maintained piping. Huatulco homeowners often experience water cutoffs (rumor has it that the water is diverted to the fancier hotels).
· Reservoirs have receded, leaving mudflats littered with trash, surrounding brownish ponds where once there were sparkling lakes; some have been closed. Perhaps worst off are the three reservoirs that comprise the Cutzamala system, which supplies Mexico City. Authorities started reducing the water distribution in October 2023; in June, they shut it down for 6 hours to make repairs. Fortunately, the rainy season has restored the Cutzamala system to 67% of capacity, from a low of 28% in June (the system is completely closed when the level drops to 20%).

Tourism and Water

Despite the water crisis, Mexico is a wildly popular tourism destination. In 2022, tourism employed 2.8 million people, over 7% of the Mexican workforce, who served over 38 million visitors. In 2023, Mexico as a tourist destination was 4th in the world, 2nd in North America; over 42 million tourists visited Mexico. In 2022, tourism spending constituted 8.5% of Mexico’s GDP; in 2024, estimates say it will make up 14.2% of GDP – tourism brought in $2.3 billion in June of 2024 alone.

All those tourists, including non-resident snowbirds, presumably come from places that are not experiencing a water crisis. And they bring their water consumption habits with them, along with a pretty accurate perception that drinking tap water is not a good idea in much of Mexico (see the Chaikens’ article elsewhere in this issue). A 2012 article on “Tourism and Water Use” in the journal Tourism Management indicates that each tourist visiting Mexico used 300 liters – just shy of 80 gallons – of water per day; in Randy Jackson’s article elsewhere in this issue, tourism consumed 15% of Huatulco’s water supply.

Current data on just how many tourists are using that water are hard to come by, outdated, and generally only count people who arrive by plane; we do know that nearly 500,000 people arrived at the Huatulco airport in 2018, and that arrivals this year are almost back to pre-pandemic levels. As tourism increases, so does tourist water usage. Rest assured, however, it’s not just that those folks are splish-splashing, taking a bath. Direct consumption of water is far from the only impact tourism has on Mexico’s water supply.

The Price of “Big Tourism”

There are those who argue that Mexico’s government privileges the interests of tourists and the tourist industry over those of local people, especially through large-scale tourism projects that bring more tourists. Referred to in 2023 as “anchor products” by then Secretary of Tourism Miguel Torruco Marqués, they include new and remodeled airports, the highway from Oaxaca to the coast, the largest aquarium in Latin America (in Mazatlán), the Callejón de Liverpool honoring the Beatles (also in Mazatlán), museums, arenas, and a Chinatown in Baja. More tourists, more swimming pools, more 5.3-gallon garrafones de agua.

The biggest “anchor product” of them all is the Tren Maya (Mayan train), pet project of Mexico’s last president, Andrés Manuel López Obrador. Intended to promote – Torruco Marqués said “detonate” – tourism in the Yucatán, the train will transport visitors from Mayan ruin to Mayan ruin throughout the Yucatán Peninsula, with side stops for other attractions. The track runs for 1,554 km (about 966 miles); the seven sections run from Palenque in Chiapas up to Mérida in Yucatán, over to Cancún and down to Chetumal in Quintana Roo, and back over to Escárcega in Campeche. In addition to tourist passengers, the train will carry freight; notably, the primary freight client is Pemex (Petróleos Mexicanos), which will be hauling fuel.

Various efforts to make the Mayan Train sustainable have taken place. The train itself provides low-impact public transportation, reducing traffic emissions. Portions are electrified or hybrid ultra-low-sulfur diesel and electric, there’s an extensive tree-planting program to replace the clear-cutting for the track, there are safe passages for wildlife, and large portions of track have been elevated to avoid disrupting the landscape beneath the tracks.

The Mayan Train and the Great Maya Aquifer

Missing, however, seems to be any concern for the Great Maya Aquifer (Gran Acuifero Maya, or GAM) one of the world’s largest aquifers, extending through the states of Yucatán, Quintana Roo, Tabasco, and Chiapas. It provides drinking water for 5 million people – if you’ve ever gone swimming in a Yucatán cenote, a water-filled sinkhole, you’ve been in the GAM.

The Yucatán peninsula was once a huge underwater coral reef, but has risen out of the sea to form a plain composed of porous coralline and limestone, and the latter is water soluble. When rain, which is slightly acid, falls on the peninsula, it percolates through to the underground cave system, wearing away the limestone. When the limestone is weakened by serving as a water filter, it collapses into the underground system, creating the open-air cenotes.

The GAM is a network of underground caves and rivers. The Great Maya Aquifer Project, part of the National Institute of Archeology and History (INAH), is mapping the aquifer and investigating “cave archeology and paleontology” – basically, what fell, or what the Maya threw, in the water, along with artifacts and wall paintings done before the caves filled up.

The Mayan train speeds over the aquifer, sometimes on crumbling limestone only three feet thick. Track builders drove 15,000 long pilings down through the limestone and into the aquifer to support the train; the impact of construction on the aquifer has yet to be measured. The process coats once pristine caves with a shards of concrete and broken stalactites. According to Guillermo D. Christy, a civil engineer with the group Cenotes Urbanos, a voluntary collective focused on preserving the cenotes of the Yucatan, “Pouring concrete into a cavern, directly into the aquifer, without any concern or care – That’s total ecocide.”

Tourism’s Indirect Effects

Less direct are the impacts of increased tourism brought by the Mayan Train. As the Yucatán population has increased (Playa del Carmen had 46,000 people in 2000, and 304,000 in 2020 – a 661% increase), the cenotes have been filling with the trash and human waste generated by too-rapid urbanization. Nearly 50% of individual wells have registered contamination. The cenotes and the wells connect to the aquifer.

Contaminating the water supply destroys more than clean drinking water. One of Tulum’s more popular tourist attractions is a cenote park called Dos Ojos (“Two Eyes”). Dos Ojos is a community-managed attraction in the nearby ejido of Jacinto Pat (ejidos are community-owned lands). Recent explorations have revealed that Dos Ojos is connected with the aquifer. The path of the train was routed around the two main cenotes, but passes directly over several others.

Some Jacinto Pat residents are not happy. An article in Time magazine (by Soraya Kishwari, January 2023) focused on the Maya Train’s impact on indigenous lifeways. One villager spoke anonymously about not wanting the Mayan Train: “It will destroy the jungle, our home, and contaminate the cenotes, our life source.” Gabriel Mazón, a resident who refused to move to make way for the train, says, “As a people, we have allowed ourselves to be bought … there is no support from indigenous people [for the Maya Train]. If our ancestors could see what is being done in their name, they would die of sadness, knowing how they have been profaned, prostituted, and their culture and traditions used.” Mazón continued, “We are little more than a brand or marketing slogan for the government. The people have already been paid off. There will be no more benefits. All we have left to wait for now is the invasion.”

Changing a culture by changing its environment is a very complicated issue. As culture and local heritage are redefined to meet tourist expectations – as they are made into commodities that are more “salable” to outsiders – culture and heritage change to reflect the value placed on them by those outsiders. You can live without water for three days; living without your history is a long, slow death.

Huatulco

Aztec Nobility – The Descendants of Moctezuma

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By Randy Jackson

At the time of the Spanish Conquest of Mexico, the Aztec civilization was highly stratified, with social classes ranging from nobility and merchants to commoners and enslaved people. The conquest devastated the Aztec civilization and social order through disease, warfare, and the imposition of Spanish rule. Yet, like the Aztecs, Spanish society was organized under a monarchy and a noble class. Intermarriages allowed some members of the Aztec nobility to integrate into the Spanish elite in what was then called New Spain. Today, several Mexican families can trace their lineage back to the ruling Aztec nobility at the time of the conquest. One notable lineage is that of the descendants of Moctezuma II, the Aztec ruler at the time of the arrival of the Spanish.

Moctezuma’s Captivity and the Aztec Rebellion

On November 8, 1519, Hernán Cortés entered Tenochtitlán, the capital of the Aztec Empire, with 400 Spanish soldiers and cavalry. The Spaniards were welcomed by the Aztec ruler, Moctezuma, in a display of pageantry, marking the historically momentous meeting of the two civilizations. However, the Spaniards quickly wore out their welcome. Within a week, Cortés had Moctezuma under a form of house arrest. Soon, the Aztec noble class began planning to rid themselves of the Spanish.

By June 1520, a full-blown Aztec uprising against the Spanish had erupted. On June 29, 1520, Moctezuma was killed, possibly by a rock thrown from within an Aztec mob. The next day, the uprising, known as “La Noche Triste” or “The Night of Sorrows,” drove the conquistadors out of the capital, forcing them to retreat to Tlaxcala with significant loss of life and almost all of their precious treasure. Among the surviving Spaniards in Tlaxcala were some of Moctezuma’s children, likely taken against their will.

Moctezuma’s Children

Polygamy was a common practice in Aztec society. Although less common in the lower classes, it was prevalent among the nobility, in part to strengthen alliances between families. For the Aztec leader, political alliances through marriage were essential for maintaining power. Moctezuma II had numerous wives and concubines and fathered many children. Historical sources vary on the exact number of his children, but they often cite around 19. Many of these children died during the tumult of the conquest and its aftermath. However, a few survived to continue the bloodline of Moctezuma. Although historical records for most surviving children are poor or nonexistent, there are better records for two children, one son and one daughter, whose stories provide a glimpse into the partial legacy of the Aztec emperor.

Tecuichpotzin / Doña Isabel Moctezuma

Tecuichpotzin, later known as Isabel Moctezuma, was the daughter of Moctezuma II and his principal wife, Teotlalco of Tlacopan, a city-state of the Aztec Empire. Born in 1509 or 1510, Tecuichpotzin was about ten years old when the Spaniards arrived in 1519. At this young age, she was already married to Atlixcatzin, the ruler of Tlatelolco, another city-state within the Aztec Empire. Atlixcatzin died in 1520. Following his death, she was quickly remarried to her uncle Cuitláhuac, who became emperor after Moctezuma II’s death. Cuitláhuac, however, succumbed to smallpox only 80 days later. She was then married to the next emperor, Cuauhtémoc, whom Cortés had executed when the Conquistadors returned to defeat the Aztecs of Tenochtitlán in 1521.

By 1526, at the age of 17, Tecuichpotzin was converted to Christianity and baptized. Henceforth she was known by her Spanish and Christian name, Isabel. Cortés then had Isabel married for the fourth time to Alonso de Grado, a close colleague. With this marriage came a grant of a large encomienda (land and slaves), the largest encomienda in the Valley of Mexico. Within about a year of this marriage, Alonso de Grado died. Cortés took Isabel into his household, and she became pregnant with Cortés’s daughter. Cortés had the child raised separately, and Isabel was married to another of Cortés’s colleagues, Pedro Gallego de Andrade. Together, Isabel and Pedro had a son in 1530; shortly after, Pedro Gallego died. In 1532, Isabel was married for the sixth (and last) time to Juan Cano de Saavedra. Together, they had five children.

In 1550 or 1551, Isabel died at the age of about 42. The children of Doña Isabel Moctezuma became prominent members of Mexican and Spanish societies, and her lineage continues to have a flourishing presence in both countries today.

Tlacahuepan / Don Pedro Moctezuma

Tlacahuepan, later known as Pedro Moctezuma, was born in 1520 or 1521, at the time of the Spanish conquest of the Aztec capital of Tenochtitlan. He was born to Moctezuma’s wife Miahuaxchotzin, the Empress of Tula’s city-state, the Toltec Empire’s ancient capital. Sometime before the Spanish siege and final conquest of the Aztec capital, Pedro and his mother relocated back to her home city of Tula. Although Pedro was too young to have witnessed the fighting and collapse of his father’s empire, for the majority of his adult life, he was involved in fighting in Spanish courts to prove his entitlement as a son of Moctezuma.

In 1522, the King of Spain appointed Hernán Cortés as governor and captain general of New Spain. Although Cortés was instructed to limit the granting of encomiendas and respect the indigenous people’s land rights, he largely ignored these directives. Cortés argued that granting encomiendas was essential for civilizing the territory and rewarding the loyalty of his followers. Additionally, he used the system to incorporate the Aztec ruling class into the emerging colonial administration. One notable encomienda was granted in Tula to Don Pedro Moctezuma.

In 1528, Hernán Cortés returned to Spain to appeal directly to King Charles I regarding conflicts with various colonial authorities and to defend himself against accusations of abuse of power and inappropriate granting of lands. In the 1530s, Spanish courts revoked Don Pedro’s encomienda, converting it to Royal Crown property. Don Pedro subsequently spent his life embroiled in legal battles in Spanish courts over his noble entitlements as a son of Moctezuma.

Don Pedro Moctezuma traveled to Spain to appeal directly to the King. In 1539, he was granted a coat of arms in recognition of his status as the son of Moctezuma II. Later, he was also granted annual sums from the crown. Don Pedro Moctezuma died in 1570, still struggling with land entitlements. However, the Spanish Crown firmly recognized his noble lineage. His grandson, Pedro Tesifón Moctezuma, was granted the title of “Count of Moctezuma de Tultengo,” which was later upgraded to “Duke of Moctezuma de Tultengo” in 1865, a title that still exists today. Holders of this title have been prominently involved in Spanish society over the centuries. Although historical records vary regarding the number of children of Don Pedro Moctezuma, it is known that two prominent sons carried on the noble lineage in Spain and with descendants also in Mexico.

Despite the collapse of the Aztec Empire and the challenges posed by colonial rule, Moctezuma’s noble lineage managed to endure and integrate into the new societal structure and carry on over the centuries. Through strategic marriages and legal battles, Moctezuma’s descendants preserved their noble status and secured recognition from the Spanish crown. The Spanish noble titles and the prominence of some of the descendants of families in Mexico testify to the legacy of Moctezuma II.

For contact or comment: box95jackson@gmail.com.

Huatulco

Social Class, Politics, Economics, and Religion: A Brief History of Aztec Sex

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By Deborah Van Hoewyk

The Aztecs are one group of Mexico’s ancient indigenous peoples; although it is a diverse group, the different peoples are connected through use of some version of Nahuatl language. They called themselves the Mexica, arrived in what is now Mexico City in the 1300s, and were conquered by Hernán Cortés in 1521. In their short two centuries of rule, however, they established an empire that stretched from the Pacific Ocean to the Gulf of Mexico and had over 400 to 500 small states and 5 to 6 million people.

How Do We Know What We Know About the Aztecs?

Until recently, our knowledge of the Aztecs – not to mention the Maya, the Olmecs, the Zapotecs, the Mixtecs (there are more) – was based on “codices,” manuscript histories written by indigenous people at the request of the conquistadors. Friars who had learned the local native language then translated the manuscripts into Spanish, and they were shipped back to the European monarchs as reports on their colonies. The codices are useful resources, but they’re more than a bit iffy about “what came before.”

Recently historians and anthropologists have begun investigating earlier writings by ancient Mexicans. In a recent (2019) book, Fifth Sun: A New History of the Aztecs, Camilla Townsend from Rutgers University, notes that “the Native Americans were more intrigued by the Roman alphabet than the Spaniards ever knew. Unbeknownst to the newcomers, the Aztecs took it home and used it to write detailed histories in their own language.”

Until now, no one paid much attention to these sources, but there has been a major effort to integrate pre- and post-conquest documents to reach a better understanding of ancient Latin American civilizations. Townsend’s book – which makes the point that the Conquest was not “introductory or climactic,” but “pivotal” in the long story of Mexico – gives us a history, in their own words, of a people who lived complex, nuanced lives in a cultural context the Spanish barely attempted to understand.

In searching for a more accurate understanding of the Aztecs – were they bloodthirsty savages? Focused only on warfare? Superstitious and easily duped into surrender? – Townsend, among other historians, introduces new perspectives to understanding “these complex and often mischaracterized people.”

Gender and Sex, Polygamy and Politics

The big picture for Aztec sex is that it occurred primarily in marriage, although the upper classes practiced “polygyny,” the kind of polygamy where a man can have multiple wives; there was no such privilege for women. There was one “true” wife, presumably the first, and the others were sometimes called “weavers.” In Aztec culture, women were the weavers, textiles were very valuable, so having many weavers increased the man’s wealth – Moctezuma had hundreds of wives. Men could also keep concubines – women to whom they were not married.

Aztec historian Caroline Dodds Pennock of the University of Sheffield in the UK looked at “Gender and Aztec Life Cycles,” a chapter in The Oxford Handbook of the Aztecs (2017). She says our notion of Aztec life driven by “brutal warriors, glorious kings, and bloody priests” is a bit off: in reality, “women in Aztec culture were powerful and effective figures, possessing tangible rights and responsibility, and clearly recognized as indispensable to society’s collective success.” That is not to say that gender wasn’t prescribed in Aztec society – the model was “complementarity,” that is, men and women had different roles that complemented each other.

As she looks at pre-Conquest Aztec life via the role of women and gender, Townsend finds upper-class women played a political role in bringing altepetls (city states) into the empire through marriage; they exercised considerable influence during the Conquest on whether any given altepetl would side with or fight against the Spanish.

Both Dodds Pennock and Townsend used documents that focused on upper-class women. In The Flower and the Scorpion: Sexuality and Ritual in Early Nahua Culture (2011), history professor Pete Sigal of Duke University argues that the “sexual lives and imaginations” of the ordinary Aztecs included pleasure, seduction, and components of the rituals of fertility and warfare. Moreover, they resisted Spanish efforts to inculcate repressive Catholic attitudes towards sex for well over a century after the conquest.

The Specifics of Aztec Sexuality

When references to specific sexual practices come up, you might think the Aztecs were just waiting for the Catholic church to arrive and say, “Nope, that’s a no-no, not that!” There was a group of deities who ruled over sexuality, and they were much given to punishing those whose sexual behavior was outside the approved realm. A couple of these gods were associated with disease – think of STDs as a punishment for sex outside marriage.

Pre-marital sex. Punishable by death. Adult men and women not allowed to interact with each other outside of marriage. Both men and women were supposed to be virginal at marriage, but women were also required to pass a virginity test (i.e., presence of the hymen). For upper-class young men, though, this prohibition didn’t really apply – they often had small collections of concubines.

Adultery. Upper-class men, of course, couldn’t commit adultery because they were allowed multiple wives and concubines. Once adultery was claimed, a lower-class man might be beaten or have his head shaved, but a woman was sentenced to death, usually by stoning.

Homosexuality. Mentioned infrequently in contemporary documents, and was punishable by death. The gay man who took the active (penetrating) role was murdered by being impaled while his partner died when his intestines were extracted through his anus – a much harsher penalty, actually, since the “receiving” partner was perceived as being less “macho.” Lesbians were killed with a garrote.

There is a double-gendered god, Xochipilli as a male and Xochiquetzal as a female, who governs flowers, love, art, and fertility; Xochipilli is the patron/protector of homosexuality and male prostitutes. There have always been festivals to Xochipilli/Xochiquetzal, suggesting that the Aztecs might have had a “Don’t ask, don’t tell, don’t get caught or we’ll kill you” policy.

Sodomy (oral or anal sex). Even among heterosexual partners, punishable by hanging.

Masturbation. Forbidden – punished by rubbing hot pepper powder on the genitals.

Prostitution. Prostitution was alive and well in Aztec society. “Respectable” Aztec women wore their hair up; prostitutes let it loose. They were the only women allowed to wear perfume, jewelry, and makeup. Sometimes prostitutes and priestesses were one and the same; they rewarded young men who survived battle with their favors. Another ritualistic role was to pleasure those men who were on their way to being sacrificed.

When the Spaniards Arrived …

The conquistadors brought their sex-as-sin Catholic beliefs with them. Within two years, they had converted two men to the priesthood and within ten years, they had begun converting the upper classes to Christianity. They hoped Christianity at the top would “trickle down” to rest of society.

Christianity, of course, requires that a man have only one wife; the Spanish began to require monogamy, which created social chaos. The additional wives, not to mention the concubines, suddenly had no legal or social status. Basically, the Spanish enslaved them, many on the encomiendas they created to reward their conquering soldiers; the Spaniard who held the encomienda had the right to tribute, produced through labor, of all inhabitants in a particular area. The Spanish replaced women who had been paid to weave with men, destroying the men’s identity as warriors. The alliances that marriages had fostered, the wealth that had accumulated within allied city-states, resolved disputes between altepetls – all suddenly thrown into disarray. Starting with its stance on sex, Catholic law destroyed a culture.

Moreover, at the urging of Queen Isabella of Spain, the conquistadors intermarried with the native peoples (she called them “free vassals of the Spanish Crown”) at a great rate. This “marathon sexual activity” on the part of the Spanish began to destroy indigeneity. By January 1, 1821, when Mexico won its independence from Spain, only half the population of Mexico was indigenous; 20% was mestizo. In the 2015 census conducted by INEGI (National Institute of Statistics and Geography), only 23% of Mexicans said they were indigenous or of indigenous descent.

Huatulco

The Pochteca

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By Julie Etra

Triple Alliance
Before addressing the subject of this article, the Pochteca, some background information about the Mexica Empire helps explain the setting within which this particular social class existed. Commonly known as the Aztec Empire, a sort of misnomer, the Empire was governed by the Triple Alliance (Alliance) from 1428-1521. On August 13, 1521, it fell to the conquering Spaniards, accompanied by the indigenous enemies of the Alliance. The Alliance was a military, political, and social agreement among three city-states who shared lands in the Basin of Mexico and joined forces for their mutual benefit. The city-states consisted of Tenochtitlan, now known as Mexico City, which was settled by the Mexica/Aztec; Texcoco, home of the Acolhua tribe who settled in the Valley 100 years before the Mexica; and Tlacopan, where the Tepaneca preceded the Acolhua by about a century. The three tribes shared the same Nahua language and a number of customs. The Alliance replaced the previously dominant Tepaneca.

Social Classes of the Empire
Within this empire/alliance existed a highly structured class system with eight more or less distinct classes. At the top was the sovereign ruler or Emperor, called the Tlatoani, (for example the last Tlatoani ruler prior to the Spanish conquest was Motecuhzoma Xocoyotzin aka Moctezuma II). The word is derived from the nahuatl verb tlahtoa, which means “to speak”, The Tlatoani was followed by the nobility, warrior class (guerreros) the high priests and priestesses, the middle class (commoners), the free poor, servants, and slaves.

Nobility

The nobility included the wealthy families within the same bloodline and lineage to which they were born. Following the leadership of the Tlatoani they ran the government, including the army, and oversaw the other classes. Their great wealth was accrued through management of the land, slavery, and tributes from outlying towns to the central government in the ever-expanding empire. Following the top-ranking Tlatoani were the Tetecuhtin, the high lords and the Pipiltin who were the regular lords.

Warriors
The soldiers were essential to the defense and expansion of the empire, conquering and subjugating surrounding territories. All Aztec males were required to serve in one capacity or another and received military training at a young age. The military offered an opportunity for upward class mobility for commoners and free/poor citizens (not unlike the contemporary volunteer military of the USA), in particular for taking captives for sacrifices and slavery. Also, somewhat similar to the contemporary USA, warfare was a major component of the Aztec economy, and innately entwined with religion (unlike the USA). Warriors were between 15 and 20 years old. To be eligible for battle recruits had to pass a physical test of carrying very heavy burdens for a predetermined duration. The warriors were also called on to provide additional protection of the Pochteca, and to keep an eye on the neighboring untrustworthy Tlaxcalans.

The Priests
The priests, next in rank, had an enormous amount of responsibility, respect, and power. They were the prophets of the society, observing and interpreting the movements of the heavens (planets and stars) and tracking planetary events such as eclipses. They had a direct line of communication with the gods, maintained the temples and organized all the religious festivities and associated gods, which were many. The priests oversaw and implemented human sacrifices to the gods over the sacrificial stones. They were responsible for the education of children as well as the general population in matters of religion and traditions, thereby wielding power and influence over society. There were female priests, known as cihuatlamacazqui, but they were much less common than their male counterparts.

The Middle Class
The middle class, or the commoners, made up the largest component of the population. This class was responsible for many of the skilled trades and included stone cutters, masons, feather workers, potters, weavers, sculptors, painters, boatsmiths, goldsmiths, and silversmiths. This class also included accountants and arbitrators for business and personal matters.

Poor/Free
This class could work their way up through the ranks through bravery in the military service or marriage. They included hunters (fowlers, who hunted the abundant waterfowl), fishermen, and the farmers who cultivated the chinampas of Tenochtitlan.

Servants
This class was similar to the serfs of Medieval Europe. They were owned by the nobility but had a higher status than slaves as they were allowed to marry, and their children were not automatically considered property of their owners. Unlike serfs, they could have side trades and additional income as well as their own slaves and servants. Like slaves, they could be sold but could also be freed with the proper documentation.

Slaves
The obvious does not need to be repeated. Many of these were captives of war, and subject to human sacrifice.

The Pochteca
And finally, the Pochteca. They were a powerful and elite class or guild of professional soldier – traders, ranking just below the nobility. The guilds were restricted, highly controlled, and membership was hereditary, passing from father to son. Being secretive, the guild did not share information about trade routes, source of goods, and third-party local merchants and suppliers. Although they served multiple purposes the Pochteca were primarily long-distance traveling merchants, particularly in luxury and exotic items, traveling from Tenochtitlan to Nicaragua and as far north as what is now New Mexico in the United States.

Trips could last months The trade or commerce was known as pochtecayotl in their Nahuatl language, derived from pochtecatl, which was one of the neighborhoods of Tlatelolco (now within modern Mexico City) that housed the Pochteca, and where the market, called a Pochtlan, sometimes spelled Puxtla or Puxtlan, was located.

The guild had their own internal structure which included another class of servants, tlamemeh or tamemes who were porters, as there were no beasts of burden until the arrival of the Spaniards with their horses. The word is derived from the Nahuatl word tlamama, which means to carry. Like other classes, they were born into this system and trained as children to carry heavy loads. The Pochteca sometimes received protection from the warrior class as they had to cross into foreign and potentially hostile territory outside the control of the Empire, including modern day Guatemala and other countries in Central America in order to obtain unique treasure such as quetzal feathers and birds (Chiapas, Guatemala, Costa Rica) and jade (Guatemala), for example. They had their own god, Yacatecuhtli, the patron saint of commerce, their own ceremonies, and their own laws and courts, overseen by Pochteca elders. They were allowed to keep merchandise, but public display was not permitted as to not outshine or offend the nobility. Hence, they were able to quietly self-enrich and organize elaborate feasts and rituals for their own community.
Some of the more exotic goods they brought to the Capital for the Tlatoani and the nobility included the aforementioned quetzal feathers and birds (check the penacho of Moctezuma II; a replica is on display in the Anthropology Museum in Mexico City. The original is on display at the Museum of Ethnology in Vienna, Austria) and other exotic and colorful birds such as scarlet macaws (Moctezuma II had an aviary), marine shells, turquoise, other gemstones, jaguar pelts, coca, and polychrome pottery. Many of these luxury items are on display at the Templo Mayor Museum just off the Zócalo in Mexico City.

Since they had license to unconstrained travel, they were well positioned for another role as spies and informants, relaying information about subordinate states, especially the aforementioned Tlaxcalans (who indeed betrayed the Mexica and sided with the Spaniards) to the central government in Tenochtitlan.

Although there were other merchant guilds in Mayan society called ppolom, compared to the Aztec Pochteca, they lacked the complex structure and unique characteristics of the Pochteca.

 

Huatulco

AMLO and the Press: From the Mañaneras to Murder?

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By Deborah Van Hoewyk

When Andrés Manuel López Obrador, better known as AMLO, was elected president of Mexico in 2018, he promised to “fix” many things – from government corruption to cartel violence, from income equality to uneven development. Some have seen progress, some have not.

AMLO keeps Mexicans apprised of his progress with five-day-a-week press conferences that start at 7 am and last 2 hours on average – these are called his mañaneras. Let’s just set aside the question of how the president of the world’s 10th largest population, 12th largest economy, and the 14th largest area, has that much time to spend talking rather than doing. What do the mañaneras contribute to AMLO’s agenda for governing Mexico?

At his daily press conference, AMLO would in theory be discussing the most important issues facing the country, responding to questions from reporters. This represents a sharp departure from previous presidents, who were mostly seen at formal public events if at all – Enrique Peña Nieto, the last president, in particular.

The Mañaneras – How – and What – AMLO Communicates

According to Francisco José de Andrea Sánchez, who holds a doctorate of law from UNAM and serves as principal investigator for UNAM’s Institute for Legal Research, the mañaneras “are the cornerstone of [AMLO’s] communication” with his followers, the people of Mexico, and even members of the government. The mañaneras are a logical outcome of the way AMLO achieved the presidency. Without social media, Andrea Sánchez argues, AMLO would not have been elected – he used social networks to get around “the media monopoly” that would not have argued his case.

The daily press conferences “avoid that same monopoly,” in a way that no other president of a major democracy has managed to do. Andrea Sánchez argues that AMLO’s two previous defeats in the presidential election led him to look for “non-censorable direct communication alternatives” to get around the “monopoly of the written and electronic mass media” that covers Mexican elections. (Earlier, AMLO had staged frequent press conferences as mayor of Mexico City, carried by BBC Mundo.)

In an interview with the LatAm Journalism Review in March of this year, Javier Garza Ramos, an independent Mexican journalist who specializes in security and protection, said the mañaneras “started as an exercise with a lot of promise, a promise of transparency where we hoped that the president would be open and answer questions from the media about important issues. But really within a few months we realized that it had become a propaganda exercise.”

Garza Ramos now describes the mañaneras as “useless,” because they are being used as a “tool of government.” For example, AMLO can put topics on the agenda that turn out “to be so frivolous” that “they absorb a lot of discussion that sometimes we don’t turn to see more important things” – like recent news about corruption or violence: “The president uses [the mañanera] to divert attention” from what he doesn’t want to talk about.

Article 19, an international organization that works to protect freedom of expression, has its hub for Mexico and Central America in Mexico City. They find that the key factor undermining the nature of the morning press conferences is that AMLO only answers questions from journalists seen as favoring his administration.

A Space to Attack Journalists

And what happens when AMLO encounters journalists who ask, when and if they get a chance, critical questions? The mañaneras are widely seen as “favorable spaces for attacking media and journalists, and even for the spread of disinformation.” When a reporter does manage to ask a question that makes AMLO uncomfortable, he is likely to reply “You are vendidos (sell-outs), you are corrupt,” or “You are plotting against the government,” or “You are attacking the government.” He describes his responses as defending the government’s honor and public power.

One of AMLO’s “defense strategies” is “doxing” journalists – that is, he approves of the release of information from personal documents (“dox”), identifying information that, in the case of journalists, encourages harassment and worse. In January of this year, information on all the journalists who attend the mañaneras was released. AMLO said the database was hacked. The New York Times said it was “a troubling and unacceptable tactic from a world leader at a time when threats against journalists are on the rise.”

In 2022, Reuters – in an undignified headline, “Mexican president names salary of critical journalist in row over reporting” – reported that AMLO said the increase from 2021 to 2022 in journalist Carlos Loret de Mola’s salary was because he was paid to do “hatchet jobs” on AMLO personally and his government. Doxing Loret de Mola was a defense of his “political project of ending injustice and corruption … This is not a personal matter. My conscience is clear.”

This winter, on Friday, February 23, AMLO doxed Natalie Kitroeff, bureau chief of The New York Times for Mexico, Central America, and the Caribbean. The doxing came in tandem with the publication in the Times of an article headlined “U.S. Examined Allegations of Cartel Ties to Allies of Mexico’s President”; note that, although the U.S. spent years on the investigation, they declined to investigate AMLO himself, as (according to unauthorized anonymous sources) the “government had little appetite to pursue allegations against the leader of one of America’s top allies.”

When queried as to whether he was endangering Kitroeff and had broken Mexico’s law of Federal Protection of Personal Data, AMLO said the doxing was not a mistake. He would do it again “when it comes to a matter where the dignity of the president of Mexico is at stake. The political and moral authority of the president of Mexico is above that.” Although he has come very close, even former U.S. President Donald Trump has not said he is above the law.

AMLO went on to say that murders of journalists were overstated, and that critical media outlets and journalists were seeking “economic and political power.” According to the LatAm Journalism Review, he said to the assembled journalists: “You feel you are embroidered by hand, like a divine, privileged race, you can slander with impunity as you have done with us … and one cannot touch you even with the petal of a rose.” One might wonder whether AMLO’s hostility to the press is a matter of deep-seated personal psychology.

Article 19 analysis also focuses on AMLO’s use of disinformation in the mañaneras. The group asked for corroboration on 34 statements AMLO made at the mañaneras or in public speeches; 32 of the 34 statements were not corroborated.

Violence against Mexican Journalists in 2023

The Mexican press, according to, among others, The Guardian (a global English-language news outlet), believes that attacks against the country’s journalists stem directly from AMLO’s mañaneras, which are an “invitation to violence.” Reporting on an open letter from Mexican journalists after an assassination attempt on news anchor Ciro Gómez Leyva in December of 2022, The Guardian asserts that conditions for journalists, which weren’t great when AMLO took office, “have deteriorated dramatically” since then. Although AMLO apparently condemned the assassination attempt, “just 24 hours earlier [he] had been publicly denigrating the journalist, warning Mexicans that if they listened to such people too much they risked developing brain tumours.”

In its 2023 report on violence against the Mexican Press, Violencia contra la prensa en México en 2023: ¿cambio o continuidad? (Violence against the press in Mexico in 2023: Change or continuation?), Article 19 defined three kinds of attacks: direct intimidation and harassment; the illegitimate use of public power to stigmatize or use judicial processes to harass; physical and digital threats. AMLO’s behavior in his mañeras is the second type, the abuse of public power. (According to the Committee to Protect Journalists, part of the John S. and James L. Knight Press Freedom Center in New York City, AMLO has accused Article 19 of “being funded by the U.S. government” to work against AMLO, thus “violating our sovereignty” – he made these accusations on World Press Freedom Day, May 3, 2023).

Article 19 found that there were fewer attacks on journalists and media outlets in 2022, which saw 561 attacks on the press, including 5 murders and 1 disappearance of journalists, than in 2023, when there were 696 attacks on the press and 12 murders.

Of the 561 attacks in 2023, 224 (40%) comprised intimidation, harassment, and threats, while 106 (19%) were abuse of public power. The remaining 41% of attacks were divided into 13 categories, with blocking or changing journalistic content, physical attacks, hacking, destruction of property, and false arrest making up 33% of the total.

Over half the attacks on the press were committed by “officials” – public employees, police, national guard, and other armed forces. The remaining attacks were carried out by individuals (actores particulares, including AMLO in his mañaneras), the cartels (10%), political parties, and unidentified attackers.

Attacks on the press appear to be related to the topics reporters cover: 53% of attacks were on those who report on politics and corruption; 24% on reporters on security and justice; and just under 10% each on those who report on protests/social movements or human rights. About 54% of attacks were on men, 30% on women, and 16% on media outlets.

The reduction in overall attacks between 2022 to 2023 is about 20%, but Article 19 still asks whether this is a real change, or merely a matter of fewer reports of violence. The report covers the next-to-last year of AMLO’s term of office, but Article 19 cites a similar reduction in attacks on the press in the next-to-last year of Felipe Calderón’s term – only to see an increase in the last year.

We will have to wait and see.

Huatulco

The Uncertain Future of the Huatulco Golf Course

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By Randy Jackson

In an earlier article in The Eye, “Bahías de Huatulco: Three Important Developments” (December 2023), I wrote about the proposed conversion of the Tangolunda golf course to a national park. Although the federal government’s announcement to convert this to a national park has not been withdrawn, there has yet to be an official decree to make the golf course into a natural area. The uncertainty looming over the fate of this crucial tourist asset for Huatulco stems from the clash of egos between the Mexican president and the billionaire owner. There have been strong reactions against the conversion to a national park, and uncertainty reigns over the future prospects of the golf course in Huatulco.

Background

The golf course in Tangolunda is known as Las Parotas, named after the majestic parota trees that enhance the beauty of the course. Established in 1991 under the administration of the federal agency FONATUR (Fondo Nacional de Fomento al Turismo), the golf course sustained operations until 2012, despite accumulating a reported loss of $26 million mxn ($1.5 million USD) over the preceding six years.

In an effort to mitigate economic losses and bolster tourism in Huatulco, FONATUR then opted to lease out the golf course. The objective was to attract third-party investments with the aim of elevating the golf course to a professional championship level. Grupo Salinas’s Producciones Especializada SA de CV, chaired by Ricardo Salinas Pliego, head of TV Azteca and Grupo Elektra, secured a ten-year lease for the golf course on August 21, 2012. To acquire the concession, a payment of $500,000 USD was made to FONATUR, coupled with an ongoing fee amounting to 10% of the golf course’s income. Leasing out the Tangolunda golf course marked a pivotal transition in its operations and future prospects.

The Golf Course during the Ten-Year Lease

After extensive redesign under the famous Mexican golf architect, Agustín Pizá, the course reopened in 2014. The improvements to the greens and fairways were impressive. It has been raised to a first-class professional level, and is the only professional golf course in the state of Oaxaca. The course is a public course, made somewhat exclusive by the high cost to play golf there. The economic viability of the golf course is not publicly available. Anecdotally it seems there are few players, yet social media reviews generally give it high praise citing the beauty and challenge of the course and the high quality of service.

During the tenure of the lease there has been some controversy, focused principally on two issues: (1) water use, and (2) lack of tournaments that would help promote Huatulco.

The water use issue was reported in the Mexican press around August of 2022. The controversy centered around the golf course refusing to use greywater from the sewage treatment plants for irrigation. This was something the golf course had done during the years of FONATUR operation. Also, the greywater use was listed as one of the environmental sustainability practices that helps Huatulco qualify for the Earth Check award (Earth Check is a global evaluation group for sustainable tourism; Huatulco has been awarded Earth Check Certification each year since 2005 up to and including 2023).

The golf course water controversy was compounded by the fact that it now uses potable water for irrigation while Huatulco overall is at or near its potable water capacity. However, not reported in any of the news articles on this issue was the fact that the golf course had drilled its own water wells for irrigation and have not been using the potable water supplied by FONATUR, which is the source of the drinking water for Huatulco. Nevertheless, the golf course is using ground water at a rate of 350,000 liters per day. (Note: As I reported in “Huatulco’s water system: In Survival Mode?” [December 2022], FONATUR produces 15 million liters of potable water per day from nine wells near the Copalita river).

The second issue cited against the operation of the golf course under the ten-year lease is the fact that the company operating the golf course hasn’t properly promoted it, which would aid in the promotion of Huatulco overall; the example cited is the failure of the course to schedule any professional golf tournaments.

Golf Course Fees

The fees to golf at Tangolunda are, to quote social media reviews, “muy caro” (very expensive). The Las Parotas website lists the fees for 18 holes: Mon-Thu, $2,700 mxn ($160 USD); Fri-Sun $4,000 mxn ($235 USD). There is a discount for locals. Although this is an expensive activity, affordable by few, the costs are not out of line for such a golf course.

To provide a comparison, on the website of the top 100 golf courses in Mexico, the Tangolunda golf course is listed as 49th. The top listed golf course on this website is Diamante Dunes in Cabo San Lucas. Its greens fees are listed at $320 USD for 18 holes. For the golf course Vidanta Nuevo Vallarta in Nuevo (Puerto) Vallarta, one up from the Tangolunda golf course on the list of best 100 courses, the cost is $195 USD.

Conversion to a National Park

With the expiry of the golf course lease in 2022, the current President of Mexico, AMLO (Andrés Manuel López Obrador) announced the golf course would be sold for $600 million mxn ($35 million USD), allowing Ricardo Salinas Pliego the first option to purchase it. Then on October 12, 2023, AMLO stated there were no purchase offers from Salinas Pliego or from anyone else and the Tangolunda golf course would be converted to a national park. This surprise announcement needs to be understood within a political context, the personal animosity between left-wing AMLO and conservative Ricardo Salinas Pliego.

According to the news site Infobae, on November 2, 2023, in his normal morning news conference, AMLO took several minutes to blame Ricardo Salinas Pliego for “leading a campaign against him.” AMLO accused Pliego of not paying taxes owed amounting to $25 billion mxn. Furthermore, he claimed that Salinas Pliego’s news organization (TV Azteca) inflated the number of deaths from the Acapulco hurricane for political purposes.

Salinas Pliego responded the same day saying that AMLO was abusing his power because his tax case was before the courts and AMLO was linking victims of the Acapulco hurricane to his (Salinas Pliego’s) organization in order to deflect political pressure on the president. The two have had public spats over private planes and educational textbooks as well.

The Current (Uncertain) State of the Golf Course

The Tangolunda golf course continues to operate normally under the ownership of Salinas Pliego, regardless of the political rhetoric. And the story is not over. There have been official protests against the conversion of the golf course by a number of Huatulco area business organizations. At the Oaxaca state level, the chamber of deputies has approved a motion asking for the Secretariat of the Environment and Natural Resources (SEMARNAT) to refrain from declaring the Tangolunda golf course a Protected Natural Area.

Moreover, when Oaxaca governor Salomón Jara Cruz announced there would be investigations into the legitimacy of some of the real estate transactions in Huatulco carried out by FONATUR during previous administrations, he added that the Tangolunda golf course, despite the announcement to convert it to a national park, was tied up in litigation over the extension of the original ten-year lease. Because of this litigation, no change can be made to the golf course.

Then on January 15, 2024, we learned that Jara Cruz has accused a particular FONATUR executive with corruption by extending the ten-year lease without authorization. Salinas Pliego has responded by saying all regulations have been followed and his company has the lease extended until 2027.

So perhaps when thinking about the future of the Tangolunda golf course, the best advice might be from historic New York Yankees coach Yogi Berra, who famously said “It ain’t over till it’s over.”

For contact or comment, email: box95jackson@gmail.com

Huatulco

Zapatistas and the Modern World

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By Brooke O’Connor

As November brings our minds to politics, we see wars and conflicts around the globe. It’s easy to think, “It’s far away from me,” or “It’s not my business,” but political unrest is around the corner in every culture.

In Mexico, we see how uprisings with the Zapatistas played out not so long ago. Those uprisings are continuing to affect important historical and cultural areas of Mexico.

Who Are the Zapatistas?

The Ejército Zapatista de Liberación Nacional (Zapatista National Liberation Army, or EZLN) is a guerrilla group in Mexico. It was founded in 1983 and named after the inspiring peasant revolutionary Emiliano Zapata, who led the Liberation Army of the South during the Mexican Revolution (1910-21). Zapata’s forces fought for land reform, with the goal of reclaiming communal lands (ejidos) stolen by large agricultural haciendas (encouraged by the national government).

On January 1, 1994, the Zapatistas initiated a rebellion from their base in Chiapas, Mexico’s southernmost state. They aimed to protest against economic policies that they believed would harm the indigenous population of Mexico. This uprising later transformed into a powerful political movement, advocating for the rights and empowerment of Mexico’s marginalized indigenous communities.

Background

The Zapatista movement has a fascinating history that should be better known. Although they say they were founded in 1983, it was in the early 1990s that they started to gain followers. From their base in the Lacandón rainforest in eastern Chiapas, they called on Mexico’s indigenous people to rise up against the one-party rule of the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI).

The Zapatistas wanted greater political and cultural autonomy for indigenous people in Chiapas and the rest of Mexico, and specifically to reform land ownership and distribution. The reason for their rebellion was a series of economic reforms introduced by the Mexican government to prepare for the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), which would link Mexico, the United States, and Canada. The Zapatistas believed that these reforms would make indigenous people even poorer, especially a land reform bill that would privatize communal farms.

The Rebellion

On January 1, 1994, NAFTA came into effect. On that very day, the Zapatistas took control of four towns in Chiapas. Led by the charismatic Subcomandante Marcos (Rafael Sebastián Guillén Vicente), they called on indigenous people from all over Mexico to join their cause. The rebels bravely held these towns for several days, battling with Mexican troops before retreating into the surrounding jungle. Over a hundred lives were lost during these initial clashes.

The impact of this uprising was far-reaching, as it quickly spread to other parts of Chiapas. In the following years, insurrections erupted in adjacent and nearby states – Veracruz, Oaxaca, Guerrero, and Puebla. Numerous indigenous communities supported the EZLN throughout this time. In fact, many municipios (roughly equivalent to a US or Canadian county) even declared themselves autonomous from both the state and federal governments, demonstrating their solidarity with the Zapatistas.

In 1994, President Carlos Salinas de Gortari started peace talks, but the conflict with the EZLN was not resolved by the time Ernesto Zedillo became president later that year. In February 1995, President Zedillo tried to use military force against the EZLN and even issued arrest warrants for Subcomandante Marcos and other important Zapatistas. However, these actions were unpopular, so Zedillo changed his mind and resumed negotiations with the EZLN.

The talks continued until February16, 1996, when both sides signed the San Andrés Accords. These accords included plans for land reform, indigenous autonomy, and cultural rights. The Mexican government, unfortunately, showed no signs of initiating any of the agreement’s provisions, and the EZLN broke off talks on August 29, requiring that the government fulfill their obligations under the Accords before talks could resume. The Mexican government offered a new agreement that basically ignored the San Andrés Accords, despite the government’s declaration that it had fulfilled the Accords. In December of that year, Zedillo rejected the agreements.

In the meantime, the government was also involved in a secret war against the rebels. They provided weapons to paramilitary groups who fought against the Zapatistas and their followers, often targeting innocent civilians to punish them for supporting the rebels. On December 22, 1997, in the tiny village of Acteal, Máscara Roja (Red Mask) a paramilitary group called aligned with the PRI, massacred 45 people, including pregnant women and children. The victims were members of a pacifist group called Las Abejas (The Bees), attending an indigenous Catholic prayer meeting. Las Abejas supported the Zapatistas, and espoused the group’s rejection of violence.

The Political Movement

Despite occasional conflicts, the Zapatistas eventually moved away from using weapons and instead focused on peaceful political actions. At the local level, they established administrative systems within the villages they controlled. Over time, they also created various local centers of government called caracoles (snails – the Zapatistas specifically meant conchas; conch shells magnify sound, both incoming and outgoing). According to Subcomandante Marcos, the caracoles are an interface between the Zapatistas and the larger world; they are

like doors which allow entry to communities and allow the communities to exit; like windows so that people can look inside and so that we can see outside; like megaphones to project our words into the distance and to hear the voice of the one that is far away. But above all to remind us that we should watch over and be responsive to the totality of the worlds that populate the world.

On a national scale, in 1999, the group organized the National Consultation on Indigenous Rights and Culture. Thousands of individual Zapatistas carried out the National Consultation by visiting indigenous towns and villages to conduct discussions of the issues driving the San Andreas Accords. On March 21, 1999, the EZLN held a national poll on indigenous rights. Approximately three million Mexicans participated in the voting, and the overwhelming majority supported the implementation of the San Andrés Accords.

Since the 1990s, amid many political twists and turns, Zapatismo has evolved into a global social movement that has gained strong support from progressive groups in the United States and Europe. The new Zapatismo movement promotes indigenous rights, cultural diversity, and standing against globalization and capitalism. Instead of focusing solely on class struggle, they believe in the power of building broad coalitions and grassroots movements to challenge the neoliberal world order. Unlike resorting to armed conflict, their strategy revolves around capturing the attention of the international media, earning them the title of the world’s first “virtual guerrilla” movement.

How Does This Affect Mexico Today?

Ironically, this anti-globalism movement has formed strong connections with foreign organizations over the years, ties that have been crucial for the EZLN’s survival. International organizations have been generous in providing donations and platforms for selling products, such as coffee, in a manner that they claim offers an alternative to globalism without exploiting indigenous communities.

These connections with other worlds beyond Mexico has led the Zapatistas to take a stance on various issues, including gender identity, the Ukraine-Russia conflict, COVID policies, rail lines in Norwegian Sami territory, and President Andrés Manuel López Obrador’s Maya Train project.

While their autonomous strategy has aimed to address local needs like healthcare and education, its effectiveness in improving the situation remains a subject of debate. Chiapas, including the Zapatista territory, continues to face extreme poverty. Moreover, the absence of federal troops has made the area quite appealing to human and drug smugglers, which is ironic considering the international connections involved.

Paradoxically, Subcomandante Marcos could well be considered the most extraordinary tourism ambassador the state has ever had. Before 1994, there were some tourists and foreign residents in Chiapas, but the media coverage attracted even more curious or idealistic people. They came not only to experience the rich native cultures but also with the hope of encountering someone wearing a black Zapatista pasamontaña (balaclava).

Moral of the Story

The only constant is change, and only sometimes does what seems to be a noble cause yield the results a movement sought initially. The author believes that the only way we can effectively initiate change is within ourselves first, then within our homes, and slowly, within our community through example and concern for our fellow man. Maybe then we can eliminate the endless death and destruction that war and uprisings bring because of political differences.

Huatulco

Coalitions and Democracy: Navigating Mexico’s Unique Political Landscape

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By Randy Jackson

Both Mexico and the United States will hold their federal elections in 2024. Although the Republic of Mexico has a federal government structure similar to that of the United States, with both countries featuring a president and bicameral legislatures, the nature of the democratic process between these two nations is strikingly different. In the United States, despite the availability of other party choices, voters, in all practicality, must choose between two political parties. In contrast, Mexico’s democracy is more dynamic, with a wide variety of viable political parties. This diversity has led to the emergence of coalitions as a fundamental aspect of the country’s political landscape. In this ever-evolving political landscape, coalitions have become pivotal in determining the course of governance in Mexico.

As we approach the Mexico General Election (scheduled for June 2, 2024), it may be helpful to provide an overview of how coalitions operate within Mexico’s federal governance.

FEDERAL GOVERNMENT STRUCTURE

The federal level of Mexico’s government consists of three branches: the Executive (President), the Chamber of Deputies, and the Senate. All three branches play crucial roles in passing legislation. Each branch operates under different electoral rules. The President is elected through a plurality vote (the highest number of votes). In contrast, the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate have members elected through both plurality and proportional representation, with each employing distinct proportional representation methodologies.

THE IMPORTANCE OF COALITIONS

With the elections of 2000, seventy years of continuous single-party rule by Mexico’s Institutional Revolutionary Party (Partido Revolucionario Institucional – PRI) came to an end with the election of President Vicente Fox. Since then, the governance of Mexico has relied on coalitions. Under the current administration of Andrés Manuel López Obrador (AMLO), seven parties hold seats in the Chamber of Deputies and Senate. These seven parties are organized into two coalitions: the governing coalition and the opposition coalition.

Prior to each election cycle, new coalition agreements are established through formal agreements among the parties. In the last federal election (2018), a left-of-center coalition, calling themselves Juntos Haremos Historia (together we will make history), was formed. It consisted of MORENA (Movimiento Regeneración Nacional, or National Regeneration Movement – MRN), the Labour Party (Partido del Trabajo – PT), and the Social Encounter Party (Partido Encuentro Social – PES). This coalition emerged victorious in the election, with AMLO securing the Office of the President. The PES dissolved in 2018. In 2020, just before the midterm elections, the entire coalition dissolved, and a new coalition – Juntos Hacemos Historia (together we make [present tense] history) – added the Green Party (Partido Verde Ecologista de México, or PVEM) to its roster. This coalition has once again chosen MORENA to lead, with Claudia Sheinbaum as their presidential candidate for 2024. Neither the PT nor the PVM will field a candidate in the presidential election, thus consolidating the votes for MORENA.

On the opposition side, a center-right coalition named FAM (Frente Amplio por México, or Broad Front for Mexico) is led by the PAN (Partido Acción Nacional, or National Action Party). It also includes the PRI, MC (Movimiento Ciudadano, or Citizens’ Movement), and PRD (Partido de la Revolución Democrática, or Party of the Democratic Revolution). This coalition enters the 2024 election with the PAN’s leader, Xóchitl Gálvez, as their presidential candidate. Similarly, the other parties in the coalition will not nominate a candidate for President to maximize support for PAN.

It’s important to note that the Presidency can be won by a candidate from one of these two coalitions or even another party. Furthermore, the composition of the Congress of the Union (comprising the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate) can result in various scenarios. This may lead to the formation of new coalitions for effective governance or possibly a period of political disarray, akin to the current situation in the United States.

THE STRUCTURE OF MEXICO’S GOVERNMENT

Understanding the significance of coalitions in Mexican governance requires a basic understanding of the division of powers between government branches and the election methods for different branches.

The Office of the President
The President of Mexico serves as the head of the executive branch, with responsibilities including being the Head of Government, Head of State, Commander of the Armed Forces, and head of the Federal Public Administration. The Presidential term lasts for six years, and Presidents are ineligible to run for subsequent elections. The President plays a pivotal role in approving or vetoing legislation. To advance a legislative agenda, the President must collaborate with the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate. Additionally, the President is responsible for making key appointments, such as those to the Supreme Court, diplomatic posts, and various federal agencies. These appointments require confirmation by the Senate.

Presidential elections in Mexico are based on a plurality system, meaning the candidate with the most votes wins. For instance, in 2018, AMLO secured 54% of the popular vote (there were four final candidates). In 2012, Enrique Pena Nieto won the Presidency with 38% of the vote (three final candidates), and in 2006, Filipe Calderon emerged victorious with 36% of the vote (three final candidates). Coalitions play a vital role in Presidential elections, as parties within a coalition with somewhat similar political leanings abstain from running their own candidates to prevent vote splitting.

The Chamber of Deputies
The Chamber of Deputies comprises 500 members, with elections held every three years. Its powers encompass passing laws, levying taxes, declaring war, initiating impeachment proceedings, and ratifying foreign treaties. Seven parties currently hold seats in the Chamber of Deputies, grouped into two coalitions: the Governing Coalition and the Opposition Coalition.

Of the 500 deputies, 300 are elected through plurality voting in each of the 300 constituencies throughout the country. The remaining 200 deputies are allocated through proportional representation. These seats are distributed based on the popular vote in five distinct regions of Mexico, each with an allocation of 40 seats. Calculations are made to assign the percentage of seats each party receives in each of the five regions.

The Senate
The Senate comprises 128 members, with four seats designated for each of the 31 states and Mexico City. Senators serve six-year terms and possess the authority to pass laws and confirm appointments to the Supreme Court, diplomatic positions, and other presidential appointments.

Out of the 128 senators, half (64) are elected directly via plurality voting in each state, along with Mexico City. An additional 64 senators are allocated through two distinct proportional representation systems. Among the directly elected Senators, the two candidates with the highest vote counts in each state and Mexico City secure a seat.

Subsequently, one additional seat is assigned for each state and Mexico City through the “First Minority System.” In this process, one Senate seat is granted for each state based on the highest percentage of national senate results overall. However, if the overall national results for the first-place party match the parties of the directly elected senators for that state and Mexico City, the seat is assigned to the next most popular party in that region.

Finally, in the “Second Minority System,” one Senate seat is allocated for each state and Mexico City based on the second highest national senate results overall. Once again, if the second most popular party nationally aligns with the party of the two directly elected senators from that state and Mexico City, the seat is awarded to the next most popular party in that region.

In conclusion, the very structure of the electoral system for the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate, with its proportional representation, promotes a diversity of political parties, thereby necessitating the formation of coalitions. As we approach the 2024 Mexican general election, it will be interesting to watch how the results will determine the reshaping of coalitions in the governance of Mexico.

Email: box95jackson@gmail.com

Huatulco

Claudia Sheinbaum: The Next President of Mexico

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By Marcia Chaiken and Jan Chaiken

Unless there is a major political upset in the next eight months, Claudia Sheinbaum is on track to be elected in June 2024 as the next president of Mexico. A poll published in September by El Universal, a major Mexico City newspaper, indicated that she was then far ahead of her four opponents; in a four-way race, she garnered 50% of the vote. Her party, the National Regeneration Movement (MORENA), in coalition with other parties, has captured the loyalty of the majority of Mexican voters; MORENA alone received 53% of the vote in the poll. And her champion, Andrés Manuel López Obrador (AMLO), the current president of Mexico and founder of left-leaning MORENA, has such a high approval rating (60%) that it is a relatively safe bet to start planning to watch her inauguration.

According to The Times of Israel, not only would Sheinbaum be the first woman president of Mexico, she would join a very small number of Jews outside Israel who have become heads of state: Janet Jagan (Guyana), Ricardo Maduro (Honduras), Pedro Pablo Kuczynski (Peru) and, of course, Ukraine’s own Volodymyr Zelensky; she would be the first Jewish person ever to head a country with a population over 50 million people. But Sheinbaum is very quiet about her Judaism, probably partly due to the adamant post-Revolution separation in Mexico between religion and state, the fact that most Jews in Mexico are politically very conservative and unlikely to vote for a MORENA candidate, and the misinformation and smear campaign used against her by her political rivals, notably the former president Vicente Fox. Although antisemitism rears its ugly head less frequently in Mexico than in many other countries, a rumor was started that she wasn’t a viable candidate for president since she was born in Bulgaria – ultimately squelched by the publication of Sheinbaum’s Mexico City birth certificate. And in response to Fox’s intimation that her rival, Gálvez, was a true Mexican (but implicitly not Sheinbaum), Claudia retorted that she was “as Mexican as mole.”

One might say that Sheinbaum has been on track to become the first woman president of Mexico since she was born, 61 years ago. Her parents, two super-achieving scientists affiliated with the National University of Mexico (UNAM), were themselves children of immigrants seeking refuge in Mexico from religious persecution. Her father’s family fled from Russian pogroms and forced conscription of Jews in Lithuania in the 1920s. Her mother’s family escaped the Holocaust, the systematic murder of Jews in Bulgaria in the 1940s. And since young Claudia was close to her grandparents and attended a Jewish secular coed elementary school, there is little doubt that she was imbued with a formative knowledge of the perils of rabid discrimination and the value of helping those who are being oppressed by powerful authoritarians.

After completing her secondary education at Colegio de Ciencias y Humanidades (CCH), a feeder school for UNAM, she matriculated at UNAM studying physics and simultaneously joining other student activists on campus. Her political activism continued throughout her undergraduate and graduate studies, and as a UNAM faculty member in 1998 she was instrumental in the founding of the Democratic Revolutionary Party (PRD). After completing her bachelor’s degree in physics in 1989, she went on to complete her master’s degree and Ph.D. in energy engineering, carrying out research at Lawrence Laboratories, UC Berkeley, on comparative international consumption of energy. She returned to UNAM when she accepted a faculty appointment in 1995.

As an undergraduate, Claudia met and briefly dated student Jesús María Tarriba Unger, currently soon to be her second husband; Tarriba completed his dissertation in physics at UNAM in 1987 and began an award-winning career in financial risk-model applied research. After breaking up with Tarriba, Claudia dated and in 1987 married Carlos Imaz Gispert. She became a stepmother to Imaz’s five-year-old son and in 1988 the couple had a daughter, Mariana, who carried out the Sheinbaum family’s multigenerational academic achievement, earning a BA in history from UNAM, a Master’s degree in comparative literature from the University of Barcelona and a master’s and Ph.D. from the University of California, Santa Cruz. Mariana currently is the Academic Coordinator of Humanities at UNAM-Boston. Claudia and Imaz were divorced in 2016 after 29 years of marriage.

One of the closest political ties Sheinbaum made during her political activism was with AMLO. As Mayor of Mexico City (CDMX), he appointed her as his environmental minister in 2000. In that position, she applied her academic knowledge to reshaping the city’s transportation system, including the installation of the highly efficient and easy-to-use MetroBus that quickly whisks passengers along many routes, including trips from the international airport to the central downtown area.

Claudia was once again back on the faculty of UNAM after 2005 when AMLO stepped down from being Mayor of CDMX to unsuccessfully run for President. She quickly shifted gears, but not fields, and became part of the United Nations Intergovernmental Panel On Climate Change, working on assessment of mitigation approaches; along with former U.S, Vice President Al Gore, the group was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 2007.

Her absence from the political arena lasted only a few years, and in 2015 she was elected Mayor of Tlalpan, a district of Mexico City. Three years later she was elected Mayor of the City itself, the first woman to hold that office. The processes leading to her election and the reforms she carried out as Mayor were described in The Eye by Carole Reedy (March and November, 2019) – but the bottom line is that she was elected by a large majority based on her platform, and she carried out the measures she promised.

Like all politicians, she has her detractors. She’s been blamed for the outcomes of natural disasters, smeared by some as being too instrumental in the success of her daughter, and accused by others as being simply the puppet of AMLO. Yet, her resume speaks for itself and she remains hugely popular. There is no doubt that she will continue to carry on some of the approaches initiated by AMLO – but given her research in and passion for mitigating climate change and building a sustainable world, one can be quite sure that she will be taking a different direction than AMLO did in supporting Mexico’s petrol industry.

Since we are not citizens of Mexico, we cannot vote for her. But given her past accomplishments, we are looking forward to seeing what successes she will have as President of Mexico.